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Chapter 10
The Changing Paradigm
of 401 (kJ Plan Servicing
Ronald D. Hurt
If one examines the changes in the employee benefit plans offered by
American companies over the past decade, it would be difficult to judge
whether medical or retirement plans had changed more dramatically.
Medical plans have undergone much change (including managed medi-
cal care, "flexible" benefits, and the shifting of medical plan costs to
employees), but developments in the world of retirement benefits have
been significant as well.
In both cases, employers have turned rapidly to new ways to pay for
these benefits, primarily looking to limit their financial exposure and
make more predictable their short- and long-term liabilities. Employers
have begun to ask their employees to pay part or even all the cost of these
benefits, and this shift has been rationalized using a variety of now-
common workplace mantras: employee empowerment, the freedom to
choose what's best for the individual, and personal control. In medi-
cal plans, it is called managed care; in retirement, it is called defined
contribution.
While the introduction of managed care plans has begun to redefine
the nature of healthcare in this country, the shift in retirement plans
from defined benefit (the traditional "pension" plan) to defined contri-
bution (primarily 401 [k]) plans may well alter the retirement landscape
even more significantly in the years to come.
Consider the following. The ability of the social security system to
continue to fund workers' retirements meets with widespread skepticism
in the workplace, in part because of fears of an encroaching national
debt and in part by aging baby boomers who must depend on fewer
young workers to support them during retirement. At the same time,
however, approximately 25 percent of employees who have a defined
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contribution retirement plan do not participate. l Of those who do, on
average they are saving no more than about 5 percent or 6 percent of
their salaries, an amount most experts agree will not provide a significant
replacement income at retirement (Foster Higgins, Inc. 1993). This is
only exacerbated by the fact that many employees eligible for such plans
do not begin saving until they are in their late thirties or early forties,
weakening the power of compound earnings (Access Research, Inc.
1995). And, by and large, 401 (k) savers put a disproportionate percent-
age of their savings in stable value funds, which many experts say will not
provide the growth necessary to build an inflation-proof nest egg (Hewitt
Associates, cited in EBRI 1995).
Finally, what savings do exist are often depleted years before retire-
ment, as job-changers take advantage of an IRS loophole that permits
access to their accumulated 401 (k) assets. When employees change jobs,
they are offered a choice: to take a "distribution" from their 401 (k) plans
(in short, to "get the cash") or to transfer the money- or a portion ofit-
to another IRS-qualified retirement plan. In alarming numbers, em-
ployees have simply taken the money, even though they will have to pay
taxes and, in most cases, a 10 percent penalty for early wi thdrawal. In 1990
alone, according to the Employee Benefit Research Institute, more than
$40 billion ofpreretirement lumfrsum distributions was not rolled over into any
other qualified plan, significantly diminishing those employees' hopes
for a richer retirement (EBRI 1994).2 One survey (Burkhauser and Salis-
bury 1993) suggests that only 13 percent of recipients "roll over" lump
sum preretirement distributions into qualified retirement instruments
and 40 percent of the recipients use some of the funds for consumption.
In short, many employees do not have access to any defined contribu-
tion retirement plan, and those who do are not all participating, are
saving at low rates, are investing unwisely, and are squandering their
savings at the first opportunity. Few if any American companies are creat-
ing new pension (defined benefit) plans, and the benefits from existing
ones are being trimmed.3
Given all this, it looks as if the once stable world of American retire-
ment security may be in for some significant and unprecedented change
(see Table 1). The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that these
changes are also having a significant and long-term effect on the way
employers' 401 (k) plans are administered and serviced by financial inter-
mediaries, primarily banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies. In
fact, the shift away from defined benefit plans, the growing emphasis on
employee involvement, and the increased use of sophisticated informa-
tion technology are all changing the basic paradigm of client service,
which is in turn changing how major portions of the financial services
industry do business and service clients.
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TABLE 1 The Evolution of 401 (k) Features: How Plan Design, Account
Information, and Client Service Are Moving from an Institutional to an
Individual Focus
Next wave: total
participant
First wave: focus on Second wave: a interaction
the institutional retail orientation facilitated by
plan sponsor for a retail customer technology
Employee access Limited primarily Prospectuses, Internet,
to plan to Summary Plan sales literature, technology-
information Description toll-free 800 driven, total
access, meetings, access to infor-
financial plan- mation and assis-
ning assistance tance, data-based
information
Investment "Mystery" funds, Mutual funds Commoditization
options limited choices, (with no-load of funds, individ-
fees hidden pricing), broker- ual securities, un-
age options, asset limited access,
allocation funds, personally man-
daily transfers, in- aged portfolios,
creased number lowered expense
of options ratios, custom-
built needs-based
portfolios
Valuation of indi- Quarterly at best, Daily or monthly Daily, or on-
vidual accounts often annually demand pricing
(with individually
traded securities)
Employee access Limited: annual Monthly or quar- Access via
to account or semi-annual terly statements; Internet
information statements statements on-
demand. 24-hour
access via 800
number
Ability for Monthly at best, Moving to daily, Daily, via Internet
employees to often quarterly via 800 #; many
transfer among still limited to
investments monthly
Definition of Plan sponsor; Still focused Participant
client investment/ pen- on plan sponsor
sion committee but increased
awareness of
participant
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The First Wave: Intense Focus on the
"Institutional" Sponsor
Until the mid-1980s, many American companies provided to their em-
ployees benefit packages (medical, dental life insurance disability, pen-
sion, etc.) that permitted almost no employee choice about individual
benefits or levels ofcoverage. The prevailing institutional view ofbenefits
packages was that "one size fits all." This attitude was seen as appropri-
ately "paternalistic" at the time, and employees appeared to be content
under such a system, in essence surrendering individual choice (if it were
ever even contemplated by the average employee) in exchange for a
comprehensive package of benefits.
The paternalistic attitude about benefits was also evident in employers'
approaches to providing retirement security through the traditional de-
fined benefit (pension) plan. Again, as'with other benefits, one size fit all,
and employee choice was almost absent from a plan's ongoing existence,
except as the eventual recipient of this paternalistic largesse.
Until about 10 years ago, an employer offering a retirement plan de-
signed it in consultation with professional benefits consultants and actu-
aries. Employers made annual contributions to "fund" the plans (usu-
ally), and they handled investment of the plan's assets with the help of
money managers (primarily banks and insurance companies). It was the
rare employer that disclosed to employees any useful information about
the financial workings of the plan (Hurley et a!. 1995). Employees were
told of the plan's existence, but often knew nothing else, except perhaps
that the company would calculate the pension amount based on a com-
plicated formula based on "years of service" and "final average pay"
(Hurley et a11995). Of course, the official "Summary Plan Description"
was available upon request, but it was infrequently requested and cer-
tainly less frequently read or understood. Employees were not encour-
aged to ask questions, and it was generally the case that the employer
would not assume that the employees had any need to know much more
than the fact that the company had a pension plan.
Because the plan sponsor - the employer - was identical for both de-
fined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) plans, it should be no
surprise that in the earliest days of DC plans, roughly the early 1980s,
employers administered them in very much the same way that they had
administered their companies' DB pension plans. Again, here, the third-
party administrators and money managers hired by plan sponsors con-
tinued to think of the employer as the client,justifiably, and continued to
manage the relationship the way they managed their traditional pension
clients. There was little focus on the employee, if any. Employers asked
insurance companies, banks, and investment management companies to
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manage the assets of the DC plan (the employees' money), often in
nonretail "separate" accounts (Hurley et al. 1995). Separate accounts are
an unregistered pool of investments managed separately from the invest-
ment manager's "general" accounts. They are not registered mutual
funds. Employee records were kept primarily by banks and insurance
companies, and an account statement- a new wrinkle from the tradi-
tional pension plan! - distributed to participants once a year was the
norm. (It is entirely possible, given the newness of these plans, the small
balances, and the history of sparse plan information, that many em-
ployees expected little more.)
Limited Information for Participants
Prior to a decade ago, the plan information employees did receive was
often limited to that mandated by federal pension regulations (primarily
through the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, ERISA). In the
case of 401 (k) plans, this was usually no more than a wordy, legal "Sum-
mary Plan Description" and an enrollment form to initiate contributions
through payroll deduction (Hurley et al. 1995). Separate accounts, un-
like mutual funds, do not have prospectuses, so descriptions to poten-
tial investors, the participants, were often inconsistent and incomplete.
Some employers explained the 401 (k) plan to newly hired employees
during their "orientation" program, but because most plans required an
eligibility period of one year, the explanation was often perfunctory and
employee interest low. Few employees understood the plans well, but,
again, it was not at all clear that that mattered much to employees ac-
customed to benefit paternalism.
"Mystery'· Funds with Infrequent Valuations
Taking a cue from their DB plans, employers generally offered separate-
account investment options, not mutual funds, as noted above. With such
investments, very little "public" information is either required or avail-
able. On the other hand, one clear difference between DB and DC plans
is that participants' accounts have to be "valued" and that value has to be
communicated to participants. In the early days of 401 (k) plans, this task
usually given over to the outside administrator or fund manager, but
semi-annual or annual valuations were felt to be sufficient.
Limited Ability to Move Money Among Investment Options
Transfers of accumulated assets within a participant's account were lim-
ited, typically, to the valuation frequency. As noted, this was almost never
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more often than once a quarter. To make the process even more onerous,
employees had to plan and formally request a transfer well in advance of
the plan's deadline for such activity, usually at least a month before the
valuation date, and based on information that was usually at least two
months old. A decade ago, employees also had little flexibility to increase
or decrease contributions from their payor change how those contribu-
tions were allocated among the plan's investment options.
Little or No Investment Choice
Early 401 (k) plans introduced to employees the ability to direct the in-
vestment of their contributions to their retirement accounts. Even ten
years ago, however, there were often no more than a handful of invest-
ment options available: a stable value option (fixed income), a balanced
(stock and bond) option, and sometimes company stock (Financial Plan-
ner 1994). Even today, investment options can be rather limited in 401 (k)
plans: it is not uncommon to find a plan with a single investment option
of company stock, resulting in single-security "portfolios" that a profes-
sional financial planner would consider quite risky.
Alternatively, the investments were insurance company separate ac-
counts, including the highly popular stable value, or fixed interest, ac-
count, often so called Guaranteed Investment Accounts (GICs). With
these accounts, employees received a rate of return that was fixed, and
announced in advance, for a specified period of time, commonly a year.
The principal and interest were "guaranteed" by the insurance company.
Because of the guarantee and the declared earnings, these options have
always been very popular with employees, often capturing as much as 50
percent of the typical plan's assets (Hewitt Associates, cited in EBRI
1995). This remains so today, despite the highly publicized failures of
several insurance companies.
Emphasis On the Needs of the Plan Sponsor
The focus of these plans, and the subsequent delivery of support services
by third-party providers, was almost exclusively on the "institutional"
client, the plan sponsor. Even contact with the sponsor by the service
provider was infrequent: annual performance reviews, perhaps, or an-
nual "rate re-sets" on the stable value options. There was next to no
contact with, or access by, employees. Employees received limited infor-
mation, about both the plan and the investment options, and much of
what they received was dated, complex, and not meant to be helpful or
supportive ofdecision making. This appears to have been based on a sort
of "Pandora's Box" theory of employee communication: "The less they
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know, and the less we remind them of this plan, the fewer headaches I'll
have to deal with!"
In short, DC plans originated with the focus on the institutional spon-
sor, and the services provided to the sponsor by third-party administra-
tors, recordkeepers, and investment managers were essentially driven by
the institutional relationship forged by the pension business. Employees
were quite secondary to the business, despite the obvious fact that, with-
out their active participation, the plans simply did not exist.
The Second Wave: Employee "Empowerment" and a
Retail Investment Orientation Brings More Information
and Access
By the late 1980s, a number of economic, market, and even social forces
were converging on the 401 (k) business that would change forever the
way these plans were designed and administered. These forces would
even begin to redefine for service providers who their "client" was and,
therefore, would also begin to reshape the nature, type, and variety of
services provided to both plan sponsors and participants.
One major reason these "Dark Ages" of 401 (k) plans drew to a close
what that the large mutual fund companies started to notice the growth
in "assets under management" within these plans by the late 1980s. In
1986, the total assets within 401 (k) plans was $155 billion; by 1988, that
figure had grown 48 percent to $230 billion and, by 1990, it had grown
another 30 percent to $300 billion (Access Research 1995). In 1996,
assets in 401 (k) plans approached $690 billion, an increase of 345 per-
cent from their levels just 10 years before (Access Research 1995). Clearly,
as more companies began to introduce 401 (k) plans, and as more em-
ployees began to contribute to them, and as earnings began to build up
with them, they became more and more attractive to a wider variety of
service providers. In short, to paraphrase the late Senator Everett Dirk-
sen, "pretty soon we started to talk about serious money."
Mutual Fund Companies Enter the Picture
When the big mutual fund companies began to enter the market, they
brought with them their "retail" approach to investments. Their funds
often had "brand" names and came with prospectuses, which made spon-
sors and participants more comfortable than the mysterious separate
accounts. Their funds were valued daily, and information on them was
available through a toll-free 800 telephone number or in daily news-
papers. The fund companies had resources to staff their telephone ser-
vice centers with people to answer participants' questions. Additionally,
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the insurance companies lost some luster when several company failures
reduced GIC values in the late 1980s. In 1989, the 401 (k) market share
eqjoyed by mutual fund companies was estimated to be 15 percent; by
1995, it had more than doubled to 33 percent (Access Research 1996). In
the same period of time, the 401 (k) market share of insurance com-
panies shrank from 39 percent to 29 percent, and that of banks dropped
from 31 percent to 24 percent (Access Research 1996).
Retail Approach Influences the Institutional Market
As the mutual fund companies began to capture more and more 401 (k)
market share, their retail orientation also began to redefine the nature of
service and the definition of "the client." Previously, the approach was
"institutional," and provider services were directed toward the plan
sponsor. Now, the approach became much more "retail," and services
began to be directed toward the individual consumer (the participant).
For example, since mutual fund companies already provided quarterly or
even monthly statements to their investors, they began to offer this ser-
vice to 401 (k) plans' participants, as well. Fund companies had glossy
marketing information and sales literature for their funds, and they even
began to offer sophisticated materials on financial planning and invest-
ment decision making. These materials could be readily adapted to meet
the special issues of401 (k) plans, and the mutual fund companies began
to use their availability for employees as a marketing tool with the plan
sponsor.
More and more 401 (k) plans being introduced in the late 1980s also
began to feature the fact that mutual funds were valued and traded daily.
This feature allowed participants to conduct daily transactions among
the plan's investment options. Today, more than a third of all 401 (k)
plans, regardless of size, have daily valuation, and, among large plans (at
companies with more than 1,000 employees), the number approaches 50
percent, with the trend accelerating over the past several years (Access
Research 1996). While many plan sponsors were initially concerned
about the advisability of offering daily transaction capability within a
long-term savings and retirement account, their fears about market tim-
ing and frequent trading have not been borne out in practice. Rec-
ordkeepers and money managers report little or no increase in partici-
pant transactions following the introduction of daily valuation. In fact,
some have postulated that having less opportunity to trade - say, in a
quarterly valued plan - puts more pressure on participants to actually do
so, since they know that if a transaction is not initiated another quarter
will have to pass before the next transaction y,'indow opens.' Daily trading
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appears to have been accepted easily by employee investors, and it is
becoming the norm. Some sponsors, however, have introduced daily
valuation of their plan investments but limited their participants to less
frequent transactions, usually monthly or quarterly. Finally, mutual fund
companies were also used to providing toll free telephone access to cus-
tomer service representatives for their retail investors, so this feature was
introduced to 401 (k) plans, as well. The participant could call essentially
24 hours a day to get up-to-date account balances, conduct transactions,
check on the status of transactions, and ask questions about the plan's
various investment options or administrative details.
In short, partly because of the mutual funds' entry into the 401 (k)
market, participants became a much more important part of the service
equation. And the plan providers-again, mutual funds, insurance com-
panies, and large recordkeepers - began to think about keeping the indi-
vidual participant happy as a way to keep their institutional client happy.
The result was that participants began to eqioy much broader access to
their accounts and much improved information about the plan and
about information about the investments within the plan.
Whither the Plan Sponsor?
Interestingly, the trend toward focusing on the needs of the individual
participant began at about the same time that plan sponsors were becom-
ing less paternal about benefits in general and at about the same time
that these plans were becoming much more important for most workers'
retirements than the traditional defined benefit pension plan.
Employers Introduce Employee Choice and
Limit Exposure to Rising Benefit Costs
At the end of the 1980s, employers began to rethink the comprehensive
benefits packages they had provided, driven in part by the rising cost of
medical benefits. Rather than provide a one-size-fits-all package, em-
ployers began to employ the concept of so-called "flexible" benefits:
providing a specified dollar amount to cover benefit costs and then let-
ting the employee choose which benefits to "buy" and at what levels. The
employee who wanted the most coverage or the richest plans might have
to pay for those benefits him or herself. This provided a very effective way
for the employer to define and predict the annual expenditures required
for employee benefits. This was in sharp contrast to the traditional
method of covering benefit costs, through which the employer paid re-
gardless of how high benefit costs might go in any given year. The con-
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ceptwas often explained in a variety of ways. New lifestyles required new
kinds of benefits packages. Employees were being "empowered" to man-
age their own benefits packages. Modern employees wanted more per-
sonal choice. In particular, employees were told that these new benefits
packages gave them the flexibility to not purchase benefits in which they
had no interest and then use those freed-up "benefits dollars" to pay for
other benefits that were attractive to them. Using the concept ofso-called
"total compensation" (which conceives that the employer provides com-
pensation comprised of salary and benefits, including holidays and paid
time off), some flexible benefits packages (primarily from larger corpo-
rations) even allow employees to buy and sell vacation days, which means
an employee willing to trade in higher benefits can have more time off
the job, and vice versa.
The effect of this trend was to introduce to employees the idea that
they were responsible for their own benefits, that they might have to pay
for higher levels of benefits, and that they had the right to choose what
they wanted. Clearly, this worked in close parallel to the changes in retire-
ment benefits: the shift from traditional employer-managed pension
plans to employee-<lirected DC programs.
"Downsizing." "Outsourcing." and Other Business Trends
Converge to Focus on the Employee
Other forces within business were also beginning to shape the delivery of
benefits in general and 401 (k) plans in particular. Many large employers
began to reduce their total number of employees, and often the "nones-
sential" or "nonline" benefits or human resources staff were among
the first to go (Institutional Investor 1994). Sometimes, these companies
turned to outside vendors to provide traditional benefits services, further
weakening the institutional ties. In fact, many employers began to look at
"total" benefits outsourcing, by which they meant contracting with out-
side vendors to provide benefits and administrative services that were
traditionally managed within the employer's own workforce.
Also, employers began to shift LO employees some of the responsibility
for funding benefit programs, including retirement benefits, and ra-
tionalized the change under the umbrella of employee empowerment.
There was even some interest among employers in a concept called "total
compensation," which meant that an employer would provide as com-
pensation a fixed-<lollar amount to employees, who would then decide
how to divide it up among such things as current pay, vacation, health
benefits, and retirement savings.
These forces combined to change the long-standing paradigm that the
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plan sponsor was solely in charge of retirement benefits and that the
participant was a secondary player whom it was best to keep in the dark.
The Next Wave: Focus on Interaction and Information,
Driven by Technology
Now that employers have empowered employees, given them open and
on-request access to information, and authorized them to make decisions
about their financial well-being in retirement, the cat, as it were, may be
out of the bag. It seems that employees will be satisfied with traditional
employer responses to investment flexibility, instant information, ac-
cess to account transactions, and education that goes well beyond plan-
specific communications. Furthermore, as account balances grow in
DC plans - the six-figure 401 (k) account is no longer uncommon-
employees may simply no longer be willing to let the management and
servicing of such significant assets be driven by what the employer deems
appropriate.
Employees are already demanding more and faster information, dif-
ferent investment options, and increased flexibility within the plan itself.
Loan features are common. Employees' accounts are "portable": they
can take their accounts with them if they change jobs. And there are even
some service providers offering brokerage options within the 401 (k)
plan. With such an option, the participant could invest in hundreds of
different no-load mutual funds and even trade individual securities.
These are not common, but as investors become more sophisticated and
balances increase, there will surely be more demand for this type of
flexibility.
But the real demand from employees is for more information, and not
just about the plan itself or the plan's investment options. Employees
want to know how make decisions about financial-planning issues, how to
manage money, and how to prepare for a financially sound retirement.
And service providers appear to be willing to provide this increased infor-
mation in order to increase assets and keep the business.
Changing Government Policy in the 40 ) (k) Market
In the mid-1990s, even the federal government has begun to contribute
to this movement toward increased investment flexibility, plan informa-
tion, and investment education. In 1995, the U.S. Department of Labor
(DOL) launched a national public relations campaign called "Save! Your
Retirement Clock Is Ticking!" in conjunction with plan sponsors and
401 (k) service providers (EBRI 1995). The point of the campaign is to
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encourage employees to understand that they now have personal finan-
cial responsibility for much of their financial well-being during retire-
ment and to continue the general education of employees on financial
planning, investment basics, and financial decision making.
The campaign was followed very quickly by an "exposure draft" in
December 1995 of the DOL's Interpretative Bulletin on Internal Reve-
nue Code (IRC) Section 404(c), with the final Bulletin released in June
1996. This provides for plan sponsors a "safe harbor" from employees
who may want to hold their employer liable for poor investment perfor-
mance or other shortcomings within the sponsor's 401 (k) plan (USDOL
1996). Essentially, 404(c) affords such protection if, generally, the em-
ployer provides (l) a reasonable selection of investment options (three
distinctly different options is the minimum), (2) the ability for individ-
uals to have reasonable access to their accounts for the purpose of mov-
ing assets among options, (3) certain information about the plan and its
investments, and (4) sufficient information that the employee can make
an "informed" decision about participation, contribution levels, and
the management of individual accounts. The Interpretive Bulletin also
makes it clear that it is permissible for employers- that is, that liability
for damages is not increased - to provide generic financial planning in-
formation, including such things as asset allocation, risk/ reward, and the
projection of individual account balances based on assumptions of invest-
ment performance by asset class. In other words, increased access and
information for the participant are not only now protected, they are even
mandated, by federal regulatory statutes.
Given the lack of information sponsors have traditionally provided and
the mystery funds they once structured, even in the recent past, one can
now ask, Whither the plan sponsor? Is not the participant the new client
for 401 (k) service providers? And, further, will not this new client demand
new products and services that the industry may be unused to providing?
The Role ofTechnology in Participant Service
Clearly, one of the most important tools to facilitate the movement to-
ward increased attention on the participant will be technology, primarily
through its ability instantaneously to provide access to, and to update,
individual account information.
This movement began with daily valuation and the use of toll free voice-
response technology, but it has already moved well beyond that initial
arrangement. Service providers now offer investment and financial plan-
ning information through the Internet, and a handful have even begun
to permit transactions within that medium. (Security remains a concern
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for many providers, but the direction is clear.) The on-line employee can
easily download mutual fund prospectuses or call up third-party evalua-
tions of various funds' current and long-term performance. Retirement
planning software-in both diskette and CD-ROM formats-are widely
available and often provided free of charge by providers expecting
greater participation and contributions (assets under management).
There are providers who have developed financial education seminars
"attended" by thousands of employees in dozens of locations across the
nation through video teleconferencing facilities. To support 401 (k) en-
rollment meetings, employers for years have asked service pro\~ders to
provide technology-based communications tools like videos, audiovisual
aids, and cassette tapes, and there are even software programs that allow
employers to enroll employees by entering data into a personal computer
and then electronically transmitting the information to the record keep-
ing department, payroll system, and other employer divisions. Employees
are now also able to enroll in their 401 (k) plans over the 800 telephone
lines maintained by service providers: no paper, no delay, no hassles.
An Example: Paperless Loan Transactions
Providers also now offer 401 (k) loans directly through voice-response,
touch-tone telephone systems. This process directly bypasses the plan
sponsor, who, in the past, had to: (1) distribute loan forms to employees
requesting them, (2) receive the forms from the employee, (3) check the
forms' accuracy, (4) forward the loan forms to the service provider, (5)
distribute the promissory note to the employee, (6) return the signed
promissory note to the service provider, and (7) sometimes even hand-
carry the check to the participan t. This process is just one of many
that clearly demonstrates how the new service paradigm puts the focus
squarely on the participant and eliminates the role of the plan sponsor
entirely, except for the initial design of the loan feature (which may have
taken place years ago) and for monitoring ongoing management reports
from the providers. In fact, this process was not driven by participants,
many of whom did not know how cumbersome the loan process was, but
by the sponsors themselves, who are asking service providers for more
and better ways to save them time and effort by refocusing their service
on the participant.
This move to a "paperless" environment, one that uses technology as a
means to provide information, investment education, account transac-
tions, instant access to account balances, and investment flexibility, is
now the most powerful force shaping the future of 401 (k) communica-
tions and administration.
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Conclusion
Given the new focus on employee-directed retirement plans, driven by
the broad range of factors noted above, the old paradigm of the primacy
of the "traditional" plan sponsor and the definition of sponsor service
may be rapidly changing. At least three assertions can be made based on
the trends discussed:
First, service providers (mutual fund companies, insurance com-
panies, third-party administrators, etc.) are now fully involved in the
business of employee communications, whether they recognize that fact
or not, and whether they do it well or not. Record keeping, administra-
tion, and even investments are becoming commodities. The most power-
ful differences in client service will be the providers' ability to motivate
employees, their power to communicate with them, their ability to under-
stand employee needs, and the resources to link technologies as a tool to
facilitate participant interaction.
Second, success in capturing DC market share will be driven to a large
part by providers' ability to blend effective employee communications
with the power and efficiency of technology. The traditional factors driv-
ing a plan sponsor's decision to purchase services from a provider (sta-
bility, fixed-income expertise, administrative, and record-keeping exper-
tise) appear to be diminishing.
Finally, once having been "empowered" to shape their own financial
well-being during retirement, employees will continue to demand prod-
ucts and services different from those their employers may have selected
in traditional defined-benefit plans. In the future, it is quite conceivable
that major 401 (k) plan features and the nature of plan servicing will be
driven by neither sponsors nor providers, but by the ever-increasing num-
ber of true clients, the participants. The sponsor's ability to provide at-
tractive and competitive 401 (k) plans, and the provider's ability to cap-
ture market share and assets may well depend on their willingness and
ability to listen to employees and where they want these plans to go.
Notes
1. The average rate of participation among employees eligible for 401 (k) plan
participation was 76 percent in 1995, according to Access Research, Inc. (1996).
2. The figure cited includes both defined benefit and defined contribution
preretirement lump-sum distributions.
3. "[O]ne recent study reported that [DB] coverage had slipped to 43 percent.
For those who are covered. the defined benefit has been defined every more
skimpily. Cost-{)f·living adjustments disappeared years ago. The percentage of
salary that a worker could get at retirement stopped rising. In the past five to ten
years, more and more employers have switched from a final-average-pay formula
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to a career average. Because the new formula draws on the earlier years ofa career
when a worker earns less, a pension based on it may be only half as rich as one
calculated with the old formula, according to Dennis Kass, a managing director at
J.P. Morgan Investment Management and the chief Federal pensions administra-
tor before [David] Walker, ... [and w] here defined benefit plans used to provide
50 to 60 percent of preretirement income, says David Veeneman, a consultant
with Hewitt Associates, they now make up only 25 to 40 percent" (Institutional
Investor 1994: 51).
4. Revealed in unpublished employee surveys and focus group research con-
ducted in 1995 and 1996 by the author for several large clients (with employee
populations in excess of 5,000) of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
Defined Contribution Group of New York.
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